Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025; Second Reading

Whiteaker argued that the bill addressed a gap identified by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade regarding access to classified information for scrutiny. Whiteaker stated that the committee would not direct operations but would strengthen parliament's capacity to examine defence strategy and capability development securely. Whiteaker emphasised that robust safeguards, including offences for unauthorised disclosure, would enable agencies to share sensitive information necessary for effective oversight.

Shoebridge opposed the bill, describing it as a secret committee dominated by major parties that would rubber-stamp defence spending and AUKUS commitments. Shoebridge argued that the model failed to provide genuine accountability and cited concerns about the cost and feasibility of nuclear submarine projects and Hunter frigate procurement. Shoebridge contended that secrecy undermined democratic oversight and that the committee would serve to shield executive decisions from public scrutiny.

Collins supported the bill, asserting that proper governance of defence was critical given the threats in the Indo-Pacific. Collins argued that the committee must exclude minor parties and independents to maintain the bipartisan convention established by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Collins criticised the government for cutting defence spending in real terms and failing to deliver on capability promises, stating that the Liberal Party would raise spending to three per cent of GDP.

O'Neill argued that the bill was essential for scrutinising defence policy, capability development, and personnel welfare in a changing strategic environment. O'Neill highlighted the importance of sovereign industrial capacity and the need for oversight that balances transparency with national security protections. O'Neill noted that the committee would allow for sustained, specialised scrutiny and constructive recommendations to improve defence outcomes.

Pocock supported the establishment of a dedicated defence committee in principle but stated his support was conditional on amendments guaranteeing crossbench representation. Pocock argued that excluding independents and minor parties undermined parliamentary sovereignty and that decisions of such magnitude required scrutiny from representatives of all voters. Pocock warned that without these safeguards, the committee risked entrenching executive power rather than providing genuine accountability.

Sharma supported the bill, arguing that greater oversight was needed to address Australia's poor record on defence capability acquisition and cost overruns. Sharma stated that limiting membership to government and opposition parties was necessary to protect sensitive information and maintain bipartisan strategic consensus. Sharma credited former Liberal senators for advocating for stronger parliamentary engagement with defence matters.

Polley argued that the bill modernised parliamentary oversight by filling a gap in classified scrutiny for defence, similar to the existing framework for intelligence agencies. Polley explained that the committee would have broad functions, including oversight of capability development, personnel issues, and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. Polley noted that the membership model allowed for flexibility, including the potential appointment of crossbench members, while maintaining robust security safeguards.