Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025; Second Reading

Wilson supported the bill, citing recent terrorist incidents as evidence of a challenging security environment requiring robust agency powers. Wilson acknowledged concerns about civil liberties but argued that the compulsory questioning powers are targeted and subject to strict thresholds and political accountability. Wilson stated that while he prefers sunset clauses for regular review, the absence of these powers would leave Australians less safe.

French argued that the bill modernises the questioning framework to address contemporary threats like digital espionage and sabotage, which were not contemplated in 2003. French detailed how the legislation strengthens safeguards by requiring Attorney-General approval for warrants and mandating a PJCIS review three years after commencement. French emphasised that the bill balances capability with transparency, ensuring powers are used proportionately and subject to rigorous oversight.

McCormack supported the bill, highlighting the critical role of ASIO in protecting national security against infiltration and terrorism. McCormack noted that the legislation expands the scope of questioning warrants to include communal violence and attacks on defence systems. McCormack commended the government for addressing concerns raised during the PJCIS inquiry and stressed the importance of bipartisan support for national security measures.

Gosling argued that the bill strikes a necessary balance between individual freedoms and collective security in a volatile threat environment. Gosling cited ASIO's assessment of multifaceted threats and the high financial cost of espionage to justify the need for permanent powers. Gosling emphasised that the powers are used as a last resort and are subject to multiple layers of oversight, including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

Chaney opposed the removal of the sunset clause, arguing that periodic review is essential for extraordinary coercive powers that infringe on fundamental rights. Chaney planned to move amendments to retain the sunset clause until 2030 and mandate statutory reviews by the PJCIS. Chaney contended that expanding the scope of questioning while removing automatic scrutiny risks normalising exceptional powers without sufficient justification.

Ambihaipahar supported the bill, linking the reforms to the need to combat online radicalisation and social division. Ambihaipahar argued that expanding the grounds for questioning to include communal violence is crucial for preventing future attacks. Ambihaipahar emphasised that strong security powers must be accompanied by community engagement and trust-building to reduce the appeal of extremism.

Haines criticised the removal of the sunset clause, arguing that it undermines democratic scrutiny and risks executive overreach. Haines expressed concern about the inclusion of border security as a ground for questioning, noting that ASIO previously recommended against this expansion. Haines advocated for judicial ratification of warrants and stronger safeguards for legal access, stating that extraordinary powers require extraordinary oversight.

Clutterham supported the bill, stating that it ensures ASIO is equipped to respond to evolving security threats such as foreign interference and sabotage. Clutterham highlighted that the legislation retains existing safeguards, including access to legal representation and oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. Clutterham argued that the permanent framework provides necessary certainty while maintaining accountability through mandated reviews.

Joyce supported the bill, arguing that Australia faces heightened threats from foreign interference and totalitarian regimes, particularly regarding Chinese state-owned enterprises and military activities near Australian waters. Joyce contended that national strength and robust intelligence capabilities are essential for safety in a dynamic global environment. Joyce emphasised the need for security agencies to operate with courage and independence to counter covert disruptions and ideological discord within the community.

Lawrence supported the legislation, stating that it balances expanded security tools with strengthened safeguards, including stricter eligibility for prescribed authorities and enhanced reporting requirements. Lawrence argued that removing the sunset clause does not eliminate scrutiny, as the bill mandates a statutory review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security after three years. Lawrence emphasised that public trust depends on the lawful, proportional, and independent exercise of these powers, noting that security and rights are complementary values.

Spender urged the government to retain the sunset clause for compulsory questioning powers, arguing that regular parliamentary review is a critical safeguard against misuse. Spender supported amendments to make reviews by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security mandatory rather than optional. Spender also expressed concern over the retention of powers to question minors, citing advice that less intrusive methods exist and that such powers risk trespassing on children's human rights.

Wallace supported the bill, asserting that it formalises powers that have been in de facto use for years and adapts them to contemporary threats like sabotage and communal violence. Wallace argued that the removal of the sunset clause provides legal certainty while maintaining oversight through independent prescribed authorities and reporting mechanisms. Wallace highlighted the sparing use of these powers over two decades and stressed the importance of equipping intelligence agencies to prevent harm before it occurs.

Steggall opposed the bill, criticising the permanent removal of sunset clauses as a reduction in democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight. Steggall raised significant concerns about the inclusion of minors in compulsory questioning powers, noting that ASIO had previously stated it did not need such authority for children. Steggall argued that the expansion of powers beyond their original post-9/11 purpose risks normalising intrusive measures and conflicting with Australia's obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.